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Is it possible to give a substantive, non-circular account of meaning and rule-following: an account 
that explains what it is for someone to use a word with a particular meaning, or to follow a particular 
rule, in terms that do not employ the concept of meaning or the concept of following a rule?  
Naturalists and reductionists about meaning and rules think it is possible to give such an account.  
Anti-reductionists, by contrast, hold that facts about meaning and rules are basic and sui generis; 
they cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, non-semantic, non-rule-involving facts.  Where 
does Wittgenstein stand in this debate?  And is he right?  I shall argue that Wittgenstein is an anti-
reductionist about meaning and rule-following, and that anti-reductionism is the correct view to 
take. 
Section 1 shows how the issue of reductionism and anti-reductionism about meaning and 
rules relates to the idea of the limits of language as it figures in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus 
writings.  Section 2 presents a framework for assessing the interpretative debate between   
reductionist and anti-reductionist readings of Wittgenstein.  Section 3 argues that we cannot settle 
that debate on the basis of Wittgenstein’s general, methodological opposition to reductionism.   
Section 4 presents an important argument for anti-reductionism from Remarks on the Foundations 
of Mathematics.  Section 5 considers some putative evidence of reductionism about meaning in the 
Brown Book and offers an alternative, anti-reductionist interpretation.  Section 6 explores the nature 
of Wittgenstein’s anti-reductionism.  It argues, first, that Wittgenstein accepts that semantic and 
normative facts supervene on non-semantic, non-normative facts and, second, that at many points 
his treatment of meaning and rules is not confined to the kind of pleonastic claims that are often 
taken to define non-reductionist, or quietist, positions. 
 
 
1. The Limits of Language 
The idea of the limits of language is a central theme in the Tractatus.  Wittgenstein writes in the 
Preface that ‘the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought’ and explains that it is ‘only in 
language that the limit can be drawn’ (TLP p. 3).  The discussion of solipsism begins with the claim 
that ‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my world’ (TLP 5.6) and goes on to explore the 
implications of that claim.  Elsewhere, we are told that philosophy ‘must set limits to what can be 
thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought’, and that its way of setting those limits is to 
‘signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said’ (TLP 4.114, 4.115).  And so on.  
By contrast, there are few comments in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus work that explicitly mention 
the limits of language.  But there are some.  And they express a theme that runs through 
Wittgenstein’s later work and marks an important point of continuity with his earlier writings.  We 
can sum up that theme in a slogan from 1930: we ‘cannot use language to get outside language’ (PR 
54). 
The general idea behind that slogan is that thought and description take place within a 
system of concepts, categories, and standards: which is to say, within language.  We cannot get 
outside language and think about or describe the world in a way that does not employ the concepts, 
categories, and standards that are built into language.  So there are limits to what we can use 
language to do.  I will mention three applications of that idea. 
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First, Wittgenstein insists that we cannot use language to advance general metaphysical 
claims about reality.  As he puts it: ‘Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the 
world and set it in relief – but it can’t be done’ (PR, 80; BT, 315.)  ‘Us[ing] language to limit the world’ 
would be using it to make a general restrictive claim about the nature of reality: a claim to the effect 
that reality comprises only some subset of the general kinds of fact that we ordinarily take it to 
include.  Wittgenstein’s basic objection to any such view is that, in order to ‘limit the world’ in this 
way, we would need a language with which to distinguish what is genuinely part of reality from what 
we ordinarily but mistakenly take to be part of reality.  But there is no such language: no special, 
philosophical language that captures the world as it really is and can be used to make our restrictive 
claims.  (As Wittgenstein puts it elsewhere, ‘philosophy doesn’t use a preparatory language’ (RFM 
392).)  The point of this Philosophical Remarks claim, that we cannot use language to limit the world, 
is essentially the same as the point Wittgenstein makes in the Tractatus when he writes: ‘we cannot 
say in logic, “The world has this in it, and this; but not that”’ (TLP 5.61). 
Second, Wittgenstein claims that we cannot use language to characterize a connection 
between language, on the one hand, and the world as it is in itself, independent of language, on the 
other hand.  As he puts it: 
The limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing the fact that 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence. 
(We are involved here with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy.) (CV 
13, 10.2.1931). 
If we ask what fact corresponds to the sentence ‘p’, Wittgenstein thinks, the only possible answer is 
‘the fact that p’.1  So though we can if we want conceive of meaning or representation in terms of a 
relation between sentences and facts (or possible facts), the relation in question is, in an important 
sense, a relation within language.  For the facts to which sentences correspond are themselves 
shaped by, and individuated in terms of, linguistic categories. 
Third, Wittgenstein claims that the impossibility of using language to get outside language 
means that ‘in a certain sense, the use of language is something that cannot be taught’: 
Suppose I have said to someone 'A is ill', but he doesn't know who I mean by 'A', and I now 
point at a man, saying 'This is A'.  Here the expression is a definition, but this can only be 
understood if he has already gathered what kind of object it is through his understanding of 
the grammar of the proposition 'A is ill'.  But this means that any kind of explanation of a 
language presupposes a language already.  And in a certain sense, the use of language is 
something that cannot be taught, i.e. I cannot use language to teach it in the way in which 
language could be used to teach someone to play the piano.—And that of course is just 
another way of saying: I cannot use language to get outside language (PR 54). 
No-one could be taught to speak and understand a first language by being given an explanation of 
how she must use words in order to speak that language.  For she could not understand the 
explanation unless she already understood a language: the language in which the explanation was 
given.  By contrast, she could be taught to play the piano by being given an explanation of what she 
must do in order to play the piano.  To understand that explanation, she must already understand 
the language in which it is given.  But she need not already be able to play the piano.  The underlying 
point here is the same as the point that Wittgenstein makes in the early sections of Philosophical 
Investigations and the Brown Book when he insists that the acquisition of one’s first language cannot 
depend on a process of ostensive definition or explanation but must instead involve ostensive 
training. 
Now what, if anything, do these observations about the limits of language have to do with 
the debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism about meaning and rules?  In RFM, 
Wittgenstein writes: ‘what the correct following of a rule consists in cannot be described more 
closely than by describing the learning of “proceeding according to the rule”’; ‘we can go no further’ 
(RFM 392).  The point of saying that ‘we can go no further’ than that in describing what the correct 
following of a rule consists in is that we cannot give an informative, non-circular explanation of what 
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it is to follow a rule correctly.  That is a clear statement of anti-reductionism.  It is also states a limit 
of language: a limit to what we can use language to do.  We can put the point in a way that brings 
out the connection between our two themes – anti-reductionism and the limits of language – by 
adapting the formulation Wittgenstein uses in CV 13: ‘The limit of language’, we might say, 
‘manifests itself in the impossibility of describing what the correct following of a particular rule 
consists in without simply employing an expression of that rule.’2 
But it is one thing to make such a claim of anti-reductionism.  It is another thing to justify it: 
to explain what reason there is for thinking that ‘we can go no further’ than Wittgenstein says.  We 
will take up that question in section 4 below.   
 
   
2. Meaning and Use  
Wittgenstein says that ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ (PI §43).3  How are we to 
understand that idea? 
Many commentators take Wittgenstein to be advancing a kind of reductionism about 
meaning.  On that reading, the point of the idea that meaning is use is to explain semantic facts 
about words (the fact that the word ‘red’ means red, for instance) in terms of non-semantic facts 
about them (the fact, for example, that people who have been through the normal training will, in 
appropriate circumstances, by and large produce the word ‘red’ in response to red things).  
According to Michael Dummett, for instance, when Wittgenstein describes the use of language,  
what is described is the complex of activities with which the utterances of sentences are 
interwoven; and . . . the description does not invoke psychological or semantic concepts, but 
is couched entirely in terms of what is open to outward view (Dummett 1978, p. 446). 
Paul Horwich takes the same view; Wittgenstein’s ‘examples of the meaning-constituting uses of 
words’, he writes, ‘are never couched in semantic or intentional terms’ (Horwich 2012, p. 112).  And 
Paul Snowdon, in a recent paper, offers a similar interpretation, arguing that Wittgenstein advances 
a broadly reductive or constitutive form of naturalism about meaning and rule-following (Snowdon 
2018).  
 Other commentators, by contrast, understand Wittgenstein as an anti-reductionist about 
meaning and rules.  They agree that, for Wittgenstein, ‘there can be nothing more to an expression’s 
having a certain meaning than its being used in a certain determinate way’ (Stroud 2012, p. 26).  But 
they maintain that the notion of ‘use’ in this context has to be understood in semantic or intentional 
terms; a description of the use of an expression that ‘suffices to fix its meaning’ must itself ‘employ 
the idea of meaning’ (Stroud 2012, p. 27).  So all we can say about the way in which use determines 
meaning is this: the word ‘red’ means red because we use it to mean red; the words ‘add 2 each 
time’ mean add two each time because they ‘are used by us to mean that two is to be added each 
time’ (Stroud 2012, p. 27); and so on.4 
 Which of these interpretations of Wittgenstein conception of meaning and use is correct?  In 
addressing that question, I shall focus on two important strands in his remarks.  On the one hand, 
there is clear evidence of anti-reductionism in Wittgenstein’s work.  In particular, there are his 
explicit general statements of quietism and of opposition to reductionism.  And there is his 
insistence on the impossibility of giving any non-circular account of what, say, following a particular 
rule consists in.  On the other hand, he does not adopt the crudest or most militantly anti-reductive 
position.  In the first place, he does not think that facts about meaning are completely independent 
of non-semantic facts about use; on the contrary, he has things to say about the relation between 
semantic facts on the one hand and non-semantic facts on the other.  In the second place, when he 
raises questions about the difference between following a rule and merely conforming to a rule, or 
about the circumstances under which it is right to translate a word of a foreign language in a 
particular way, he does not give merely pleonastic answers but aims to say something genuinely 
informative.  To understand Wittgenstein’s position, we need to understand the relation between 
W Child – ‘We can go no further’: Meaning, Use, and the Limits of Language - in H. Appelqvist (ed.) Wittgenstein and the 
Limits of Language, Abingdon: Routledge, 2020, pp. 93-114.  
 
4 
 
these two strands in his work: the combination of anti-reductionism about meaning and rules with a 
willingness to describe the phenomena in a way that is not wholly pleonastic.  
That combination of views is nicely expressed in a passage from RFM: ‘Don’t demand too 
much, and don’t be afraid that your just demand will dwindle into nothing’ (RFM 383).  The passage 
comes in the context of a discussion of mathematics and the relation between mathematical 
propositions and empirical facts.  But the point Wittgenstein is making applies equally to our case.  
On the one hand, we should not demand a reduction of semantic facts to non-semantic facts.  On 
the other hand, we are entitled to demand some account of the relation between semantic and non-
semantic facts; and we should not be afraid that the only thing to say about that relation will be 
something entirely trivial and pleonastic.5   
 
3. Wittgenstein’s Anti-Reductionist Metaphilosophy 
It might be thought that the question, whether Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and rule-
following is a form of reductionism is easily settled in the negative – and against such interpreters as 
Dummett, Horwich, and Snowdon.  For doesn’t Wittgenstein state explicitly and repeatedly that 
philosophy should reject all forms of reductionism?  He says, for example, that ‘it can never be our 
job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything.  Philosophy really is “purely descriptive”’ 
(BB 18).  And he expresses a similarly anti-reductionist message when he speaks approvingly of ‘That 
marvellous motto, “everything is what it is and not another thing”’ (LC 27).6  So, it will be said, there 
is no question of Wittgenstein’s offering an account in which facts about meaning and rule-following 
are reduced to, or constructed from, non-semantic, non-normative facts.  To offer such an account 
would be to ignore his own injunction that it is not the job of a philosopher to reduce anything to 
anything.  And it would fly in the face of his insistence that meaning and rule-following are what they 
are and not other things. 
  The prominence in Wittgenstein’s work of such statements of anti-reductionism plainly 
carries some weight.  But we cannot rest the whole case for an anti-reductionist reading of 
Wittgenstein’s view of meaning and rules on these general disavowals of reductionism.  For we 
cannot tell, at this level of generality, where Wittgenstein himself would draw the line between an 
objectionably reductionist view and an acceptable, non-reductionist view.  Suppose you are giving a 
naturalistic account of meaning of the kind that Dummett and others attribute to Wittgenstein, in 
which a sign’s having the meaning it does is explained in terms of its role in a complex pattern of 
non-semantic behaviour.  And suppose that, in your view, that account of meaning is a piece of 
common sense: a statement of what we all ordinarily acknowledge when we free ourselves from 
philosophical prejudices.  Then in giving your naturalistic account, you will not see yourself as 
reducing facts about meaning to something else.  On the contrary, you will take yourself to be giving 
a descriptive account of meaning, as Wittgenstein requires.  And you will think that any supposed 
features of meaning that cannot be accommodated within your naturalistic account are not genuine 
features of meaning at all; they are merely artefacts of a bad philosophical picture of meaning.  We 
know from Wittgenstein’s general methodological stance that he will reject any position about 
meaning or rule-following that he takes to conflict with our common-sense understanding of the 
phenomena or to involve reducing semantic and normative facts to something else.  But without 
knowing precisely what he takes to be part of that common-sense understanding, we cannot tell 
which specific views he would regard as being unacceptably revisionary or reductionist.   
I think Wittgenstein does reject the kind of reductionist naturalism about meaning and rule-
following that is suggested by interpreters like Dummett, Horwich, and Snowdon.  But to establish 
that point, we have to examine the details of his discussion of rules and meaning. There is no quick 
way of defending an anti-reductionist interpretation by appeal to his general statements about 
philosophy.7 
 
 
4. An Argument for Anti-Reductionism 
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In RFM 392-3, Wittgenstein gives a clear statement of anti-reductionism about rules.  And he offers 
an argument in favour of that position.  What is the argument?  Is it a good argument? 
Wittgenstein writes:  
A language-game, in which someone calculates according to a rule and places the blocks of a 
building according to the results of the calculation.  He has learnt to operate with written 
signs according to rules. – Once you have described the procedure of this teaching and 
learning, you have said everything that can be said about acting correctly according to a rule.  
We can go no further.  It is no use, for example, to go back to the concept of agreement, 
because it is no more certain that one proceeding is in agreement with another, than that it 
has happened in accordance with [the] rule.  Admittedly going according to a rule is also 
founded on an agreement. 
 To repeat, what the correct following of a rule consists in cannot be described more 
closely than by describing the learning of ‘proceeding according to the rule.’  And this 
description is an everyday one, like that of cooking and sewing, for example.  It presupposes 
as much as these. It distinguishes one thing from another, and so it informs a human being 
who is ignorant of something particular.  (Cf. the remark: Philosophy doesn’t use a 
preparatory language, etc.) 
 For if you give me a description of how people are trained in following a rule and 
how they react correctly according to the training, you will yourself employ the expression of 
a rule in the description and will presuppose that I understand it. (RFM 392-3; I have 
adjusted the translation of the penultimate sentence of paragraph 1) 
Paragraph 2 of that passage contains a clear, anti-reductionist message: ‘what the correct following 
of a rule consists in cannot be described more closely than by describing the learning of “proceeding 
according to the rule”’.  That repeats a claim made in paragraph 1: ‘once you have described this 
procedure of teaching and learning, you have said everything that can be said about acting correctly 
according to a rule.  We can go no further’.  But what reasons does Wittgenstein have for saying 
this?  What stops us from ‘going further’ and giving a non-circular, constitutive account of what it is 
to act correctly according to a rule? 
It is important first to be clear about what exactly it is that Wittgenstein is saying cannot be 
reductively explained.  When he talks about ‘what the correct following of a rule consists in’, and 
about ‘acting correctly according to a rule’, what is he referring to?  We need to distinguish between 
two kinds of question: (a) questions about rules themselves (e.g. the question, what one must put 
after ‘1000’ in order to act in accordance with the rule add 2); and (b) questions about what it is for 
a person to follow those rules (e.g. the question, what makes it the case that someone who puts 
‘1002’ after ‘1000’ is following the add-2 rule, rather than merely conforming to it).  Wittgenstein’s 
concern in RFM 392-3 is predominantly with questions of type (a) rather than questions of type (b).  
He is concerned with the question, what it takes for an act to accord with a particular rule, rather 
than the question, what it takes for someone to be following that rule rather than merely 
conforming to it.  But there is every reason to think that he has a similarly anti-reductionist approach 
to answering (b)-type questions. 
Now what reason does Wittgenstein give for the anti-reductionist position he articulates in 
RFM 392-3?  What prevents us describing what the correct following of a rule consists in more 
closely than by describing the learning of ‘proceeding according to a rule’?  Paragraph 3 offers an 
answer: 
if you give me a description of how people are trained in following a rule and how they react 
correctly according to the training, you will yourself employ the expression of a rule in the 
description and will presuppose that I understand it.   
How exactly is that reflection supposed to count in favour of anti-reductionism?   
It might be suggested that Wittgenstein is making essentially the same point in this passage 
that we saw him making in the passage from PR 54 that was quoted in part 1 above.  His point there 
was that ‘any kind of explanation of a language presupposes a language already’; so we cannot use 
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language to teach a language to someone who does not already have one.  Someone might read 
paragraph 3 of RFM 392-3 in a similar way, as offering the following argument.  ‘If you give me a 
description of what it is to follow a rule correctly, you will employ expressions of rules in your 
description.  I can only understand your explanation, therefore, if I already understand the 
expressions of rules it contains.  And I can only do that if I can already follow rules.  So there cannot 
be a description of what it is to follow a rule correctly that could be used to teach someone how to 
follow rules in the first place; if she cannot already follow rules, she will not understand the 
explanation.’   
That argument, however, does not show that it is impossible to give a reductive explanation 
of what it is to follow a particular rule correctly: to act correctly according to that rule.  For consider.  
Suppose for the sake of argument that there was some correct, non-circular, reductive account of 
what it is to follow a particular rule correctly: say, an account on which what counts as following the 
rule correctly at a particular step is defined in terms of the responses given by the majority of people 
who have been through a certain training.8  And suppose we agree that in order to understand that 
account, we would already have to be able to follow rules.9  It follows that we couldn’t use the 
reductive account to teach someone how to follow rules in the first place.  But that would not 
prevent it being a successful reductive account.  The requirement for a reductive account of rules is 
that it should explain what counts as following a given rule correctly in terms that do not simply 
presuppose it.  There is no requirement that it should be something that could be used to impart the 
ability to follow the rule to someone who could not already follow any rules.10 
However, it is a mistake to read the argument of RFM 392-3 paragraph 3 in the way just 
sketched.  Wittgenstein is indeed offering an argument against the possibility of a reductive account 
of what the correct following of a rule consists in.  But his argument is different.  His fundamental 
point is that the only way to specify what it is to follow a particular rule correctly is to use an 
expression of that very rule.  That is a point he makes in many places.  For example: 
How does one describe the process of learning a rule? – If A claps his hands, B is always 
supposed to do it too.  Remember that the description of a language-game is already a 
description (RFM 320). 
His point is this.  When I describe the process of learning a particular rule, I must say what it is that 
the learner is learning to do.  That requires saying what counts as acting correctly according to the 
rule she is learning.  In the current case, we can suppose that the rule B is learning is this: ‘Whenever 
A claps a rhythm, clap the same rhythm’.  Call that ‘the Clapping Rule’.  What counts as acting 
correctly according to the Clapping Rule?  The obvious answer is: when A claps a particular rhythm, 
clapping the same rhythm.  Wittgenstein’s point is that that answer is true, but that it does nothing 
to explain what it is to clap the same rhythm as A; it simply takes that for granted.  And, he thinks, 
the same will be true for any other answer we might give.  The only way of describing what counts as 
acting correctly according to the Clapping Rule is to employ some expression of the Clapping Rule 
itself.  As we put it above: the limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing 
what following a particular rule consists in without simply employing an expression of that very rule.  
It is impossible to give a non-circular, reductive account of what it is to act correctly according to a 
particular rule. 
  That is the argument that Wittgenstein articulates in paragraph 3 of the RFM 392-3 passage.  
It is also the argument that he offers in paragraph 1, where he says that ‘It is no use . . . to go back to 
the concept of agreement, because it is no more certain that one proceeding is in agreement with 
another, than that it has happened in accordance with [the] rule’.11  Suppose someone offers an 
account like this: What it is to follow the Clapping Rule correctly in a particular set of circumstances 
is to behave in a way that agrees with the way A has behaved in those circumstances.  As before, 
that claim is true.  But it does not explain what it is to follow the Clapping Rule in terms that do not 
presuppose it.  For what it is for S’s behaviour to agree with A’s behaviour is no simpler or more 
basic than what it is for S’s behaviour to be in accordance with the Clapping Rule.  We cannot use the 
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idea of agreement to give a reductive explanation of what correctly following the Clapping Rule 
consists in. 
These remarks of Wittgenstein’s state an anti-reductionist view: the only way of specifying 
what it is to follow a particular rule correctly is to employ an expression of that very rule.  But does 
he offer an argument for that claim; or does he simply assert that it is true?  In other passages, he 
mentions a range of possible reductive accounts.  For instance: 
The question arises, what we take as [the] criterion of going according to the rule.  Is it for 
example a feeling of satisfaction that accompanies the act of going according to the rule?  Or 
an intuition (intimation) that tells me I have gone right?  Or is it certain practical 
consequences of proceeding that determine whether I have really followed the rule?  (RFM 
319).   
Each of those suggestions (‘a feeling of satisfaction’, ‘an intuition’, ‘certain practical consequences’) 
points to a candidate reductive account: an account that aims to spell out what it is to act correctly 
according to a particular rule in terms that do not presuppose it.  But Wittgenstein thinks that each 
account is obviously unsatisfactory.  In the first place, they get the extension of the rule wrong.  
Acting with a feeling of satisfaction, for example, is neither necessary nor sufficient for acting in 
accord with a rule: we sometimes have feelings of satisfaction when we fail to act correctly 
according to the rule we are trying to follow; and we do not always have feelings of satisfaction 
when we succeed in following the rule correctly.  And similarly for the other proposals.  In the 
second place, the candidate accounts go wrong by making it an empirical issue what counts as 
applying the rule correctly in a particular case.  As Wittgenstein puts it, if one of these proposals 
were correct: 
it would be possible that 4 + 1 sometimes made 5 and sometimes something else.  It would 
be thinkable, that is to say, that an experimental investigation would show whether 4 + 1 
always makes 5.  (RFM 319) 
But those things are obviously not possible and not thinkable.  That is to say, these reductive 
accounts fail to capture the internal or conceptual character of the connection between a rule and 
what counts as acting correctly according to the rule.  And, Wittgenstein thinks, the same problems 
will arise for any other reductive account.12  Admittedly, he does not offer a proof that there could 
be no successful reductive account.  But anti-reductionist positions can rarely be established by 
proof.  The anti-reductionist can demonstrate the inadequacy of particular reductionist proposals by 
producing counter-examples.  Beyond that, however, the case for anti-reductionism must rest on 
the plausibility of the claim that the failure of those particular proposals is symptomatic of a general 
problem with any reductionist proposal.  And, of course, the anti-reductionist must stand ready to 
consider other reductionist accounts if they are proposed, and to show how they fail. 
As I have said, the topic of the anti-reductionist considerations Wittgenstein offers in RFM 
392-3 is what I called the (a)-type question: what it is to act correctly according to a given rule.  
Someone might accept that we cannot give a reductive answer to that question, but maintain that 
we can nonetheless give a non-circular, reductive answer to the (b)-type question: what it is to 
follow a particular rule, rather than merely acting in accordance with it.  That is a possible position in 
logical space.  But, as I read him, it is not Wittgenstein’s position.  His approach to the (b)-type 
question is as resolutely anti-reductionist as is his approach to the (a)-type question.13 
 
 
5. Language-Games in The Brown Book 
I have claimed that, when Wittgenstein says that the meaning of a word is its use in the language, 
the notion of use has to be understood in an anti-reductionist way.  As I have noted, however, many 
commentators disagree.  And the language-games described in the Brown Book are sometimes cited 
as evidence of Wittgenstein’s treating the relation between meaning and use in broadly reductive 
terms.  So I want to consider a representative Brown Book example that might seem to support a 
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reductionist reading of Wittgenstein.  I shall show how it can be accommodated within the anti-
reductionist interpretation I am advocating. 
Wittgenstein writes: 
Consider this language game: A sends B to various houses in their town to fetch goods of 
various sorts from various people.  A gives B various lists.  On top of every list he puts a 
scribble, and B is trained to go to that house on the door of which he finds the same scribble, 
this is the name of the house.  In the first column of every list he then finds one or more 
scribbles which he has been taught to read out. When he enters the house he calls out these 
words, and every inhabitant of the house has been trained to run up to him when a certain 
one of these sounds is called out, these sounds are the names of the people.  He then 
addresses himself to each one of them in turn and shows to each two consecutive scribbles 
which stand on the list against his name.  The first of these two, people in that town have 
been trained to associate with some particular kind of object, say, apples.  The second is one 
of a series of scribbles which each man carries about him on a slip of paper.  The person thus 
addressed fetches say, five apples.  The first scribble was the generic name of the objects 
required, the second, the name of their number. 
What now is the relation between a name and the object named, say, the house and 
its name?  I suppose we could give either of two answers.  The one is that the relation 
consists in certain strokes having been painted on the door of the house.  The second 
answer I meant is that the relation we are concerned with is established, not just by painting 
these strokes on the door, but by the particular role which they play in the practice of our 
language as we have been sketching it. -  Again, the relation of the name of a person to the 
person here consists in the person having been trained to run up to someone who calls out 
the name; or again, we might say that it consists in this and the whole of the usage of the 
name in the language-game.  (BB 172) 
On one reading, this passage and others like it show Wittgenstein taking a broadly reductive 
approach to meaning.  His idea, on this interpretation, is that a sign’s being the name of something – 
a house, a person, a kind of fruit, a number – consists in the existence of an appropriate pattern of 
non-semantic behaviour involving that sign.  Thus, when Wittgenstein describes ‘the usage’ of the 
name, he avoids characterizing that usage in semantic terms.  He does not talk about such actions as 
using a scribble as the name of a particular person, or using it to call someone ‘NN’, or to say 
something about someone.  On the contrary, he confines himself to describing simple, non-semantic 
actions and interactions between people.  It is, on this reading, the role of a sign in such patterns of 
simple, non-semantic behaviour that is constitutive of its being used as a name. 
 If we accept that interpretation of the Brown Book passage, there is a question about how 
far the reductive account is supposed to go.  Wittgenstein’s description of the use of the scribbles 
includes such phenomena as people calling out words, running up to someone, addressing 
themselves to other people, fetching apples, and so on.  Those characterizations may be non-
semantic.  But, on the face of it, they are not non-intentional; for calling out words, running up to 
people, and the rest are intentional actions.  So if Wittgenstein is gesturing at a reductive account of 
meaning, the reduction in question will be a limited one; it will not yield an account of facts about 
meaning in non-intentional terms. 
In my view, however, the Brown Book passage is not proposing a reductive account of 
meaning at all.  What Wittgenstein is describing in this example is not our language but a simpler 
and more primitive language-game.  In our community, there are facts of these kinds: someone’s 
saying that someone is such-and-such; someone’s calling someone ‘NN’; someone’s using the sign 
‘NN’ as a person’s name; and so on.  In the Brown Book language-game, by contrast, there are no 
semantic facts of that kind: the pattern of sign-involving activity that Wittgenstein describes is too 
basic and primitive to be a practice of giving and using names.  So, though he describes the scribbles 
as ‘names’ in the context of the example, they are not what we would call ‘names’.  But they play a 
role in the simple language-game that is analogous to the role of names in our language.  So we can 
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use the simple language-game to make a point about the relation between signs and things that is 
equally true of the relation between names and objects in our language.  In particular, the point of 
the example is that the relation between a sign and a thing is not constituted by anything ‘static’: a 
scribble being painted on a house; the fact that someone has been trained to run up when a 
particular sound is called out; and so forth.  Rather, it essentially involves something ‘dynamic’: the 
role of the scribble in the whole practice of the language-game.14  Wittgenstein makes that point in 
connection with the primitive, scribble language-game.  But the point applies equally well to the 
relation between a full-blown name in our language and the thing or person whose name it is.  The 
simple language-game is introduced as a way of making that point about our language. 
That way of understanding the Brown Book passage fits well with what Wittgenstein says 
about the role of language-games in his method: 
Our clear and simple language-games are not preliminary studies for a future regimentation 
of language – as it were, first approximations, ignoring friction and air resistance.  Rather, 
the language-games stand there as objects of comparison which, through similarities and 
dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of our language.  (PI §130) 
The scribble example is a ‘clear and simple language-game’.  Wittgenstein is not offering it as a 
preliminary stage in a prospective full account of language.  He is not suggesting that we can build up 
from the simple case to give an account that shows how the relation between name and object in 
our language is constituted by a sufficiently complex pattern of the kinds of simple, non-semantic 
action that he describes.  Rather, he is using the scribble example as an ‘object of comparison’ to 
make a point about the simple case that is true of our language, too.  Seen in that light, the scribble 
example offers no evidence in favour of the suggestion that Wittgenstein takes a reductionist view 
of meaning and use. 
 
 
6. Supervenience and the Avoidance of Pleonasm 
I have argued that Wittgenstein is an anti-reductionist: facts about meaning, rules, and rule-
following, he thinks, are sui generis; they cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, facts about 
anything else.  On the other hand, he thinks that there is a close relation between semantic and 
normative facts on the one hand, and lower-level, non-semantic and non-normative facts on the 
other; if the lower-level facts were very different then the semantic and normative facts would be 
different, too.  And he aims to say something substantive and non-pleonastic in response to 
constitutive questions about meaning and rules.  These latter aspects of Wittgenstein’s treatment 
distinguish his view from the simplest, most flat-footed kinds of anti-reductionism.  How should we 
understand this element of his position? 
 
6.i Though Wittgenstein is clearly opposed to attempts to reduce facts about meaning and rule-
following to more basic facts, he is equally clear that there is an important relation between 
semantic and normative facts, on the one hand, and facts characterized in non-semantic, non-
normative, terms on the other hand.  For instance: 
What if we said that mathematical propositions were prophecies in this sense: they predict 
what result members of a society who have learnt this technique will get in agreement with 
other members of the society? ‘25 x 25 = 625’ would thus mean that men, if we judge them 
to obey the rules of multiplication, will reach the result 625 when they multiply 25 x 25. -  
That this is a correct prediction is beyond doubt; and also that calculating is in essence 
founded on such predictions.  That is to say, we should not call something ‘calculating’ if we 
could not make such a prophecy with certainty.  This really mean: calculating is a technique.  
And what we had said pertains to the essence of a technique. (RFM III-66) 
One message of that passage is that the existence of a practice of calculating requires the existence 
of a pattern of empirical regularities in behaviour, non-normatively characterized.  If it weren’t true 
that people who have been through the normal training in calculation, and have been accepted as 
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competent in multiplication, by and large give the result ‘625’ when asked what 25 x 25 equals, 
there would be no practice of multiplying in our community.15   
It is natural to express Wittgenstein’s view in terms of supervenience.  Facts about rule-
following cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, non-normative facts about people’s 
behaviour; but they do supervene on such non-normative facts.  That is to say, two worlds cannot 
differ with respect to facts about rule-following without differing in some non-normative respect; 
and if two worlds are alike in all non-normative respects, they must also be alike with respect to all 
the facts about rule-following.  In the same way, semantic facts cannot be reduced to, or explained 
in terms of, non-semantic facts; but they do supervene on non-semantic facts.16 
 
6.ii We can reach the same understanding of Wittgenstein’s position from a different direction, 
by considering the picture of the nature and status of common-sense psychology that he offers in 
Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology volume II.   
 Wittgenstein presents common-sense psychology as a sui generis scheme of description and 
explanation: a scheme that we all use when we talk and think about ourselves and others.  And, he 
thinks, we should accept such talk at face value and understand it on its own terms.  In his words: 
I look at this language-game as autonomous.  I merely want to describe it, or look at it, not 
justify it. (LW II 40) 
The descriptions and explanations of common-sense psychology cannot be reduced to, or correlated 
with, or explained in terms of, those of the physical sciences.  But that does nothing to undermine 
them or to threaten their truth.  For common-sense psychology does not depend for its legitimacy 
on the possibility of any such reduction or correlation.  It is, as Wittgenstein says, autonomous. 
At the same time, he insists that the truth of psychological descriptions and explanations 
does not require the existence of anything that is not provided for by the physical sciences.  
‘Mental’, as Wittgenstein puts it, ‘is not a metaphysical, but a logical, epithet’ (LW II 63).  Physical 
investigation could in principle give a complete account of the physical make-up of a person, and of 
the physical processes that take place within a person and produce the movements of their body, 
including the movements involved in speaking: an account that did not mention thoughts, 
intentions, experiences and so on.17  But the possibility of such a physical account does not 
undermine the descriptions and explanations of common-sense psychology.  For common-sense 
psychology does not depend on the assumption that human behaviour is produced by non-physical 
mechanisms; it is compatible with accepting that human beings are exhaustively composed of 
physical matter.      
What emerges from Wittgenstein’s comments about the status of common-sense 
psychology is the following picture.  On the one hand, common-sense psychology is a sui generis 
scheme for describing and explaining the behaviour of human beings.  It cannot be reduced to, or 
correlated with, the physical scheme.  On the other hand, common-sense psychology does not 
introduce any distinctive, non-physical ontology.  If we fix all the physical facts, we fix all the facts, 
including the facts of common-sense psychology – and the facts about meanings and rules.  That 
way of putting things would not normally be associated with Wittgenstein.  But, I think, it is 
completely faithful to his views.  And it is of a piece with the ideas about supervenience sketched in 
6.i.  
 
6.iii A third way of approaching the character of Wittgenstein’s anti-reductionism is to consider 
how he responds to his own constitutive questions about rules and meanings.   
What does it take for someone to be following a rule rather than merely conforming to a 
rule?  Wittgenstein’s response to that question is not simply to say, pleonastically, that what it takes 
for someone to be following a particular rule is, precisely, for them to be following that rule.  He 
tries to say something more informative than that.  We can illustrate the point with an example.  
Wittgenstein writes: 
Let us consider very simple rules.  Let the expression be a figure, say this one: 
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|– –| 
and one follows the rule by drawing a straight sequence of such figures (perhaps as an 
ornament). 
|– –||– –||– –||– –||– –| 
Under what circumstances should we say: someone gives a rule by writing down such a 
figure?  Under what circumstances: someone is following this rule when he draws that 
sequence?  It is difficult to describe this. 
If one of a pair of chimpanzees once scratched the figure |– –| in the earth and 
thereupon the other the series |– –||– –| etc., the first would not have given a rule nor 
would the other be following it, whatever else went on at the same time in the minds of the 
two of them. 
If however there were observed, e.g., the phenomenon of a kind of instruction, of 
showing how and of imitation, of lucky and misfiring attempts, of reward and punishment 
and the like; if at length the one who had been so trained put figures which he had never 
seen before one after another in sequence as in the first example, then we should probably 
say that the one chimpanzee was writing rules down, and the other following them (RFM 
345). 
The behaviour of the chimpanzees can be described in terms that do not presuppose that a rule is 
being given and followed; the first chimpanzee scratches the figure |– –| in the earth and the second 
scratches the series |– –||– –| etc.  If that is just a one-off occurrence, Wittgenstein says, no rule 
has been given or followed.  When it happens in the right kind of context, however, we do have a 
case of giving and following a rule.  But what exactly are the circumstances under which we should 
say that a rule is being given and followed?  The simplest anti-reductionist response would be to say 
merely that the circumstances under which we should say that a rule is being given and followed are 
just those in which people (or chimpanzees) are participating in a practice of giving and following 
rules.  But that is not what Wittgenstein says.  Instead, he tries to say something genuinely 
illuminating and non-pleonastic about what it takes for there to be a custom of giving and following 
such rules, and what it takes for two people (or chimpanzees) to be participants in such a practice.  
In particular, he suggests that the existence of a practice of following rules involves the existence of 
a whole pattern of rule-involving activity.  Some of the activities he mentions in RFM 345 are 
particular to the situation of learning: instruction, showing how, imitation, etc.  Others are more 
general: reward and punishment, for instance.  But the most basic feature of rule-following, which is 
implicit in all the activities Wittgenstein mentions, is that giving or following rules involves treating 
or understanding actions as being correct or incorrect.  The idea of understanding an action as 
correct or incorrect is no more basic than the idea of following a rule itself.18  So Wittgenstein’s 
comments do not promise a reductive account of what it is for people (or chimpanzees) to be giving 
and following rules.  But they do offer genuine illumination by describing, in non-reductive terms, 
the kind of complex structure of activities that he takes to be required if something is to count as an 
instance of giving or following a rule.19 
We can see the same features in Wittgenstein’s non-reductionist treatment of the relation 
between meaning and use.  At one point in the Brown Book, Wittgenstein imagines an objection to 
some of the cases he describes: 
It is an important remark concerning this example and others which we give that one may 
object to the description which we give of the language of a tribe, that in the specimens we 
give of their language we let them speak English, thereby already presupposing the whole 
background of the English language, that is, our usual meanings of the words.  Thus if I say 
that in a certain language there is no special verb for ‘skipping’, but that this language uses 
instead the form ‘making the test for throwing the boomerang’, one may ask how I have 
characterized the use of the expressions, ‘make a test for’ and ‘throwing the boomerang’, to 
be justified in substituting these English expressions for whatever their actual words may be.  
To this we must answer that we have only given a very sketchy description of the practices 
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of our fictitious languages, in some cases only hints, but that one can easily make these 
descriptions more complete. (BB 102) 
The ‘more complete’ descriptions would spell out how the words or phrases in question are used, in 
a way that explained why, or how, they have the same meanings as the relevant English expressions.  
Thus: 
whether a word of the language of our tribe is rightly translated into a word of the English 
language depends upon the role this word plays in the whole life of the tribe; the occasions 
on which it is used, the expressions of emotion by which it is generally accompanied, the 
ideas which it generally awakens or which prompt its saying, etc., etc.  As an exercise ask 
yourself: in which cases would you say that a certain word uttered by the people of the tribe 
was a greeting?  In which cases should we say it corresponded to our ‘Goodbye’, in which to 
our ‘Hello’?  (BB 103) 
We can say, of course, that a word of an unfamiliar language corresponds to our word ‘Goodbye’ 
just in case it is used by speakers of that language in the same way that we use the word ‘Goodbye’: 
or, more simply, if it is used by those speakers to mean Goodbye.  But can we get beyond pleonastic 
statements like that?  Can we spell out, in non-semantic, non-intentional terms, exactly how the 
word ‘Goodbye’ is used in our language and, therefore, how a word in another language must be 
used in order to be rightly translated as ‘Goodbye’?  There is nothing in Wittgenstein’s discussion to 
suggest that we can.  But he does think that, when we consider particular cases, we can say 
something to justify particular assignments of meaning in a way that respects the constraint of anti-
reductionism whilst going beyond the kinds of pleonastic formulation just mentioned. 
We can illustrate that point with another part of the same discussion.  Wittgenstein 
imagines a case in which ‘the men of a tribe are subjected to a kind of medical examination before 
going into war’.  An examiner puts them through tests involving various physical activities: skipping, 
lifting weights, etc.  Wittgenstein asks what justifies translating some expression of these people’s 
language by the English expression ‘Go through the test for throwing the boomerang’.  He offers the 
following as the kind of account that would justify such a translation: 
The examiner uses orders for making the men go through the tests.  These orders all begin 
with one particular expression which I could translate into the English words, ‘Go through 
the test’.  And this expression is followed by one which in actual warfare is used for certain 
actions.  Thus there is a command upon which men throw their boomerangs and which 
therefore I should translate into, ‘Throw the boomerangs’.  Further, if a man gives an 
account of the battle to his chief, he again uses the expression I have translated into ‘throw 
a boomerang’, this time in a description.  (BB 102-3) 
In that passage, Wittgenstein does not say merely that what justifies translating an expression by the 
English words ‘go through the test for throwing the boomerang’ is that people use it to mean go 
through the test for throwing the boomerang.  He does something to unpack what it takes for an 
expression to be used with that meaning: pointing to the kinds of feature that would in fact be 
appealed to by an anthropologist or a radical interpreter in coming to understand an unfamiliar 
language.  Thus, he stresses that the expression contains a form of words that is an ingredient in a 
range of different orders; and that it contains another form of words that is used for the action of 
throwing boomerangs in descriptions as well as commands.  But there is no suggestion in those 
comments that we could explain what it is for an expression to mean ‘throw a boomerang’ in 
entirely non-semantic, non-intentional terms.  Indeed, Wittgenstein simply helps himself to the 
semantic notions of an expression’s being ‘used for’ a certain action, and of an expression’s being 
used in a ‘command’ and in a ‘description’.  It is true that he then goes on to say something more 
about the kind of circumstances that would justify the judgement that a particular expression is 
‘used for’, or refers to, the action of throwing a boomerang; he mentions the fact that, when the 
expression is used in a command, it is followed by people throwing their boomerangs.  But that fact 
does not come close to supplying a reductive account of meaning.  (As before, the fact that the 
utterance of an expression is regularly followed by people throwing boomerangs is neither necessary 
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nor sufficient for it to mean ‘throw a boomerang’.)  Similarly, he goes on to say something about 
what it takes for an utterance to be a command or a description: 
what characterizes an order as such, or a description as such, or a question as such, etc., is – 
as we have said – the role which the utterance of these signs plays in the whole practice of 
the language. 
But there is no indication that the distinctive role that characterizes an utterance as an order, or a 
description, or a question can be specified in wholly non-semantic, non-intentional terms. 
 The picture of the relation of meaning and use that we get from this Brown Book discussion 
is this.  What it takes for an expression of a language to have a given meaning is for it to be used in a 
particular way.  The relevant way of using the expression cannot be spelled out in wholly non-
semantic, non-intentional terms.  But we can say something more about the meaning-constituting 
use of an expression than simply to repeat the pleonastic formulation that, for an expression to 
mean, say, ‘Goodbye’ is for it to be used to mean Goodbye.  That is the point that emerges from 
Wittgenstein’s reflections on what would justify us in translating an unfamiliar expression by a 
particular English word or words.  His view of the relation between meaning and use, like his view of 
rule-following, is an anti-reductionist one.  But it is not the crudest kind of anti-reductionism.  Facts 
about meaning and rules are not completely independent of non-semantic, non-normative facts; on 
the contrary, they supervene on them.  And we are not confined to making pleonastic claims when 
we say how a word must be used in order to have a given meaning, or when we describe the 
conditions under which someone counts as following a rule. 
 
6.iv I have argued that Wittgenstein’s position about meaning and rules combines anti-
reductionism with a willingness to go beyond merely pleonastic statements about meaning and use 
or about rules and rule-following.  That message may seem uncontroversial.  But neither element is 
universally accepted and both deserve emphasis.  The anti-reductionist nature of Wittgenstein’s 
treatment needs emphasis because some readers continue to see his view of meaning and rules as a 
form of reductionism.20  And it is equally important to emphasize the non-pleonastic nature of his 
treatment, and his acceptance that facts about meaning and rules are grounded in, and supervene 
on, non-semantic, non-normative facts.  One reason why some philosophers reject anti-
reductionism about meaning and rules is the thought that, unless some form of reductionism were 
true, the existence of meaning and rules would conflict with a reasonable, naturalistic view of the 
world; it would imply the kind of Fregean non-naturalism that Wittgenstein plainly rejects.  But that 
thought is mistaken.  Wittgenstein’s treatment shows how facts about meaning and rules can be 
grounded in non-semantic, non-normative facts without being reducible to, or explicable in terms of, 
anything non-semantic or non-normative.21 
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Notes 
1 Wittgenstein’s simple statement of the point is a bit too simple.  For in cases of synonymy or 
analytic equivalence, we can pick out the fact that corresponds to a given sentence without repeating 
that very sentence.  We can say, for instance, that the fact that corresponds to the sentence ‘John is 
a bachelor’ is the fact that John is an unmarried man.  The same is true when we use one language to 
talk about another.  That complicates Wittgenstein’s point, but it does not undermine his 
fundamental intuition. 
2 For a related discussion of the limits of language theme in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus writings, 
and its relation to his anti-reductionism about meaning and rules, see Stroud 2012. 
3 Wittgenstein restricts this ‘explanation’ to ‘a large class of cases of the employment of the word 
“meaning”’.  We can focus on that class of cases, leaving aside those to which Wittgenstein’s 
explanation is not intended to apply. 
4 For other statements of Stroud’s anti-reductionism about meaning, see Stroud 2000, pp. ix, 130, 
91-2.  For other anti-reductionist readings of Wittgenstein on meaning and use, see McGinn 1984, 
McDowell 1984, Child 2011 pp. 101-104, 114-21.  Boghossian 1989 advocates anti-reductionism 
about meaning as the best response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein; he does not take a stand on 
Wittgenstein’s own position. 
5 For a similar message, see RFM 323 b-c. 
6 For other well-known statements of anti-reductionism, see e.g. PI §§124, 126. 
7 See Snowdon 2018, 23-25 for similar remarks, with which I am broadly sympathetic. 
8 I do not suggest that this form of communitarianism is a plausible account of what the correct 
following of a rule consists in.  I state it only for the sake of argument. 
9 That assumes that using words involves following rules.  It seems clear that Wittgenstein accepts 
that assumption: ‘Following according to the rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language-game.  It 
characterizes what we call description’ (RFM VI-28). 
10 See Ginsborg 2011a 163-6 for related considerations against an argument for anti-reductionism 
about meaning and understanding that she plausibly ascribes to Stroud. 
11 Wittgenstein puts the point in epistemic terms (‘it is no more certain . . .’).  But I take his 
fundamental point to be constitutive rather than epistemic. 
12 Notice the close relation between these two arguments against reductive accounts and the main 
arguments that Kripke’s Wittgenstein gives against dispositional analyses of meaning: that our 
dispositions are finite and include dispositions to make mistakes; and that no dispositional account 
can capture what Kripke calls the normative dimension of rules and meaning.  (See Kripke 1982, pp. 
22-37.) 
13  I offer some support for this claim in section 6.iii below. 
14  For the idea that meaning requires something dynamic, not something static or stationary, see e.g.  
PG 55, 100, 149; LFM 184. 
15 For similar passages, see e.g. RFM 325, 327, 355. 
16 For discussion and defence of this supervenience claim, and its attribution to Wittgenstein, see 
Child 2019. 
17 For this point, see e.g. LW II 31, 36, 40. 
18  I disagree here with Hannah Ginsborg, who argues that there is a primitive way of taking a 
performance to be appropriate in its context, which is independent of any prior grasp of meaning or 
rules (see Ginsborg 2011a, 2011b, 2012).  She appeals to this ‘consciousness of . . . primitive 
appropriateness’ (2011, p. 248) to offer a ‘partly reductionist’ explanation of facts about meaning and 
rule-following (2011, p. 230).  I hope to discuss this interesting proposal elsewhere. 
19  This paragraph is based on Child 2019, pp. xx-xx.  
20 As noted earlier, Horwich 2012, Snowdon 2018 are recent examples.  Ginsborg also suggests that 
Wittgenstein’s account is not a fully anti-reductionist one. 
21 Earlier versions of this material were presented the conferences ‘Wittgenstein and the Limits of 
Language’ at the University of Helsinki in 2016 and ‘Wittgenstein: The Place of Normativity in a 
Naturalistic World’ at the University of Ottawa in 2018.  I am grateful to the participants on those 
occasions for very helpful comments and discussion. 
                                                 
